



Economic and Cyber Crime Committee of the City of London Police Authority Board

Date: TUESDAY, 25 JUNE 2024
Time: 2.00 pm
Venue: COMMITTEE ROOMS, 2ND FLOOR, WEST WING, GUILDHALL

Members:

Deputy James Thomson (Chair)	Graham Packham
Tijs Broeke (Deputy Chair)	Deputy Dawn Wright
Nicholas Bensted-Smith	Michael Landau (External Member)
Alderman Professor Emma Edhem	Deputy Christopher Hayward
Jason Groves	Naresh Hari Sonpar
Deputy Madush Gupta	James Tumbridge
Sir Craig Mackey	Deputy Andrien Meyers

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Ian Thomas CBE
Town Clerk and Chief Executive

AGENDA

Part 1 - Public Agenda

1. **APOLOGIES**

2. **MEMBERS' DECLARATIONS UNDER THE CODE OF CONDUCT IN RESPECT OF ITEMS ON THE AGENDA**

3. **MINUTES**

To approve the public minutes and non-public summary of the meeting held on 19 February 2024.

For Decision
(Pages 7 - 10)

4. **PUBLIC OUTSTANDING REFERENCES**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 11 - 12)

5. **NATIONAL LEAD FORCE PERFORMANCE PACK PROPOSAL 2024-2025**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Decision
(Pages 13 - 16)

6. **INNOVATION & GROWTH – UPDATE OF CYBER & ECONOMIC CRIME RELATED ACTIVITIES**

Report of the Executive Director of Innovation and Growth.

For Information
(Pages 17 - 20)

7. **Q4 NATIONAL LEAD FORCE PERFORMANCE 2023-24**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 21 - 42)

8. **Q4 CYBER GRIFFIN UPDATE**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 43 - 46)

9. **PUBLIC FCCRAS UPDATE**

Chief officer to be heard.

For Information
(Verbal Report)

10. **QUESTIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE**

11. **ANY OTHER BUSINESS THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONSIDERS URGENT**

12. **EXCLUSION OF THE PUBLIC**

MOTION - That under Section 100(A) of the Local Government Act 1972, the public be excluded from the meeting for the following item(s) on the grounds that they involve the likely disclosure of exempt information as defined in Part I of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act.

For Decision

Part 2 - Non-Public Agenda

13. **NON-PUBLIC MINUTES**

To agree the non-public minutes of the meeting held on 19 February 2024.

For Decision
(Pages 47 - 48)

14. **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGAGEMENT PLAN FOR ECONOMIC AND CYBER CRIME**

Joint report of the Town Clerk and the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 49 - 76)

15. **CYBER GRIFFIN: FINANCIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT OPERATING MODEL**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 77 - 84)

16. **CYBER GRIFFIN: DETAILED DESIGN FOR NATIONAL ROLLOUT**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 85 - 92)

17. **ECONOMIC CRIME AND CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY BILL AND ONLINE SAFETY BILL - IMPACT AND ACTION**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 93 - 96)

18. **FCCRAS BRANDING UPDATE**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 97 - 140)

19. **FCCRAS- REVISED BUSINESS CASE**

Report of the Commissioner.

For Information
(Pages 141 - 162)

20. **QUESTIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE**

21. **ANY OTHER BUSINESS THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONSIDERS URGENT AND WHICH THE COMMITTEE AGREE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHILST THE PUBLIC ARE EXCLUDED**

**ECONOMIC AND CYBER CRIME COMMITTEE OF THE CITY OF LONDON
POLICE AUTHORITY BOARD
Monday, 19 February 2024**

Minutes of the meeting of the Economic and Cyber Crime Committee of the City of London Police Authority Board held at Committee Rooms, 2nd Floor, West Wing, Guildhall on Monday, 19 February 2024 at 1.45 pm

Present

Members:

Deputy James Thomson (Chair)
Tijs Broeke (Deputy Chairman)
Andrew Lentin
Jason Groves
Naresh Hari Sonpar

Officers:

Richard Riley CBE	- Town Clerk's Department
Oliver Bolton	- Town Clerk's Department
Kezia Barrass	- Town Clerk's Department
Eleanor Savil	- Department of Innovation and Growth

City of London Police

Nik Adams	- T/ AC City of London Police
Oliver Shaw	- T/ Commander City of London Police
Chris Bell	- City of London Police
Hayley Williams	- City of London Police

1. APOLOGIES

Apologies were received from James Tumbridge, Nicholas Bensted-Smith, Alderman Emma Edhem, Dawn Wright and Michael Landau.

2. MEMBERS' DECLARATIONS UNDER THE CODE OF CONDUCT IN RESPECT OF ITEMS ON THE AGENDA

There were no declarations.

3. MINUTES

RESOLVED – that the minutes of the Economic and Cyber Crime Committee on 11 November were approved as an accurate record.

4. PUBLIC OUTSTANDING REFERENCES

Members received a report of the Commissioner which outlined the public outstanding references.

During the discussion the following points were noted:

- Members commended the good performance and low call waiting times reported for Action Fraud, and raised concerns about maintaining this during the transition to the new service.
- Members welcomed the national Stop, Think, Fraud campaign, but felt the related comms were slightly two dimensional, and did not include any reference to Action Fraud.
- Members were keen to measure resilience within businesses and communities in relation to fraud and economic crime.
- The Chair noted the provisional dates for the Cyber Griffin sessions and noted that these should be confirmed and circulated as soon as possible to Members of the Court of Common Council and relevant CoLP officers.

RESOLVED – that the report be noted.

5. Q3 NATIONAL LEAD FORCE PERFORMANCE 2023-24

Members received a report of the Commissioner which provided an overview of the National Lead Force performance in Q3 of 2023 – 2024.

During the discussion the following points were noted:

- Work was ongoing in the run up to national elections, to protect against cyber attacks and to consider hostile state interference and ensure counter activity is managed effectively and safely.
- Concern was raised in relation to the impact of deep fakes and their real risk of manipulation of voters and fundraisers. A national structure has been launched in the last month to oversee the management of polling stations and connect this work with the Prevent and Protect teams.
- The Chair suggested that items 5 and 6 could be amalgamated as a single report going forward.

RESOLVED – that the report be noted.

6. NATIONAL LEAD FORCE AND CYBER UPDATE

Members received a report of the Commissioner which outlined the National Lead Force and Cyber update.

During the discussion the following points were noted:

- Significant work was undertaken with limited resources by Officers to deliver core work within the City and support the national lead force responsibilities.

RESOLVED – that the report be noted.

7. CYBER GRIFFIN QUARTERLY UPDATE

Members received a report of the Commissioner which outlined the quarterly Cyber Griffin programme.

During the discussion the following points were noted:

- A Member had experienced the Cyber Griffin training and felt that the impact of training delivered by City of London Police officers should not be underestimated, and queried when the issues with the software would be resolved. A report would be brought to the May Economic and Cyber Crime Committee, to outline the rollout ambition and cost implications.

- The Incident Response Hydra was outlined as a tabletop exercise which provided a set of circumstances and the range of support available, designed to assess the responses to each offer of support.
- The Chair supported this work and noted positive feedback from those who have undertaken the courses.

RESOVLED – that the report be noted.

8. INNOVATION & GROWTH – UPDATE OF CYBER & ECONOMIC CRIME RELATED ACTIVITIES

Members received a report of the Executive Director Innovation and Growth which provided an update on cyber and economic crime related activities.

During the discussion the following points were noted:

- Members were surprised that this work had no wider PR coverage.
- Members expressed the need for more joined up working within the Corporation to ensure wider reach of this work.
- The Chair suggested linking this work with the upcoming Global Fraud Summit as an opportunity for the Police Authority Team and corporate Comms team support the event.

RESOLVED – that the report be noted.

9. QUESTIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

There were no questions.

10. ANY OTHER BUSINESS THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONSIDERS URGENT

There was no other business.

11. EXCLUSION OF THE PUBLIC

RESOLVED – That under Section 100(A) of the Local Government Act 1972, the public be excluded from the meeting for the following items on the grounds that they involve the likely disclosure of exempt information as defined in Part I of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act.

12. NON PUBLIC MINUTES

RESOLVED – that the non public minutes of the Economic and Cyber Crime Committee on the 11 November 2023 be approved as an accurate record.

13. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGAGEMENT PLAN FOR ECONOMIC AND CYBER CRIME

Members received a report of the Town Clerk and Commissioner of Police which outlined the strategic communications and engagement plan for economic and cyber crime.

RESOLVED – that the report be noted.

14. FRAUD AND CYBER CRIME REPORTING AND ANALYSIS SERVICE - PROGRAMME PROGRESS REPORT

Members received a report of the Commissioner which provided a progress report of the fraud and cyber crime reporting and Analysis service.

RESOLVED – that the report be noted.

15. QUESTIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

There were no questions.

16. ANY OTHER BUSINESS THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONSIDERS URGENT AND WHICH THE COMMITTEE AGREE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHILST THE PUBLIC ARE EXCLUDED

There was no other business.

The meeting ended at 15:20.

Chairman

Contact Officer: Kezia Barrass
Kezia.Barrass@cityoflondon.gov.uk

ECONOMIC AND CYBER CRIME COMMITTEE – PUBLIC REFERENCES

7/2023/P	9 November 2023 Item 6 Q2 NLF Performance update	Powers conferred upon the CoLP by legislation, the Online Safety Act 2023 and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, is being mapped across the force, including data-sharing with appropriate entities including private-sector entities – a more wide-ranging update on that is expected to be delivered to the Committee at a later date.	Commissioner of Police	Complete- This is a report on the agenda.
1/2024/P	19 February Item 7- Q3 Cyber Griffin Update	Discussion took place on timing of any further report on the National Roll out options of Cyber Griffin as it was noted this had been developing for some time now. AC Adams undertook to get a report back to May ECCC	Commissioner of Police	Complete- This is a report on the agenda.

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Agenda Item 5

Committee(s): Economic & Cyber Crime Committee (ECCC)	Dated: 25 June 2024
Subject: National Lead Force Performance Pack Proposal 24-25	Public
Which outcomes in the City Corporation’s Corporate Plan does this proposal aim to impact directly?	CoLP impact the following Corp Plan outcomes: Dynamic Economic Growth- (National Lead Force) Vibrant Thriving Destination- (Community Safety/ CT)
Does this proposal require extra revenue and/or capital spending?	No
If so, how much?	N/A
What is the source of Funding?	N/A
Has this Funding Source been agreed with the Chamberlain’s Department?	N/A
Report of: Commissioner of Police Pol 62-24	For decision
Report authors: Lucy Cumming (Economic Crime Directorate, CoLP)	

Summary

This report sets out the proposal to change and update the current National Lead Force (NLF) Performance Pack that is produced quarterly and presented to the ECCC.

The new Performance Pack will reflect the objectives and measures set within the National Policing Strategy for Fraud, Economic and Cyber Crime, and include national performance in the areas that City of London Police, under NLF functions, lead and co-ordinate.

Recommendation

Members are asked to:

- Note the report
- Approve the proposal

Main Report

Background

1. The current NLF Performance Pack outlines the performance of NLF teams against the 5 outcomes in the NLF Plan which concluded in 2022.
2. The National Policing Strategy for Fraud, Economic and Cyber Crime 2023 – 2028 was launched in November 2023. The strategy sets commitments for all of policing under 3 core strategic objectives which will improve the policing response to the threats of fraud, economic and cyber crime. These are to:-
 - Improve outcomes for victims
 - Proactively pursue offenders
 - Protect people and businesses from the threat
3. Under each of these core objectives are a number of commitments and actions for national, regional and force level teams that include measures to reflect success against them.
4. NLF has set key performance indicators for force level and regional level fraud and economic crime teams that will be measured through newly designed Power BI Dashboards.
5. NPCC Cyber Portfolio has also set measures for the cyber network which reflect the objectives set within the national strategy.
6. NLF teams have aligned their performance measures to reflect the national strategy and objectives.
7. Performance measures will align with deliverables set under Home Office Grant Agreements.
8. These new and amended performance indicators have begun to be measured from April 2024 and will be reflected in the new Performance Pack presented to this Committee going forward.

Proposal

9. The new pack will contain a page each outlining national policing performance against the core strategic objectives for fraud, economic and cyber crime. These national 'dashboards' will include data collated from national systems such as Agency and partner management information system (APMIS), Joint Asset Recovery Database (JARD) and also the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) outcomes data. These will enable the force to review how the policing networks are meeting their national objectives and targets set by the Home Office under the grant agreements that City of London Police receive to deliver improvements and co-ordinate response as the national lead in these areas.

10. The pack will then look to measure the outcomes and performance of National Lead Force teams against the objectives set in the national strategy. An Executive Summary page will outline how collectively the NLF teams are meeting the commitments set out under the core objectives of:-

- Improve outcomes for victims
- Proactively pursue offenders
- Protect people and businesses from the threat

11. Each NLF unit will feed into a performance dashboard that will be used internally to measure outcomes, identify where improvements are required and where the teams are meeting their targets. The measures collected will reflect objectives set in the national strategy.

12. A higher level performance dashboard will collate the unit measures under the key strategic objective areas and this will be presented in the NLF Performance Pack under NLF Operational Teams.

13. The teams and functions under the Economic Cybercrime Policing HQ will also own and update internally managed performance dashboards that will feed into a higher level ECPHQ page in the NLF Performance Pack.

NFIB / Action Fraud and FCCRAS

14. The upcoming Fraud and Cyber Crime Reporting and Analysis Service will have benefits and measures that will be monitored and fed into oversight boards and the Home Office to ensure that the new system is meeting its requirements.

15. The Theory of Change documents capabilities, benefit owners and measures against areas that will need to be monitored to ensure that the new system meets its target of reducing the impact of fraud in the UK.

16. The NLF Performance Pack will include a page that monitors FCCRAS measures and outcomes in relation to the Theory of Change.

17. In addition each of the units and teams will feed into a dashboard that will enable internal monitoring of performance and outcomes. This will also feed into a higher level dashboard to be presented at ECCC and to the Home Office.

Conclusion

18. The new performance pack will reflect national and National Lead Force outcomes and achievements against the objectives set in the National Policing Strategy for Fraud, Economic and Cyber Crime.

19. This will include national dashboards for each of the threat areas to enable review of the effectiveness and success of City of London Police role in leading

and co-ordinating the police response to fraud, economic and cyber crime. These national dashboards will reflect progress against the targets and deliverables set by the Home Office in their grant agreements and national strategies.

20. The NLF Operations and ECPHQ performance dashboards will reflect National Lead Force units performance against the nationally set objectives in the National Policing Strategy. There will be internally managed unit focused dashboards that feed into this.
21. Action Fraud and NFIB teams will also produce unit focused performance dashboards that feed into a higher level framework that is presented at ECCC. In addition to this there will be a framework that is linked to the Theory of Change benefits to ensure that the new system is meeting its requirements as set out in the FCCRAS programme.

Lucy Cumming

Head of Economic Crime Strategy and Government Affairs

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Committee(s): Economic & Cyber Crime Committee	Dated: 25/06/2024
Subject: Innovation & Growth – Update of Cyber & Economic Crime related activities	Public
Which outcomes in the City Corporation’s Corporate Plan does this proposal aim to impact directly?	Driving Economic Growth
Does this proposal require extra revenue and/or capital spending?	No
What is the source of Funding?	NA
Report of: Damian Nussbaum, Executive Director Innovation and Growth	For information
Report author: Elly Savill, Senior Policy and Innovation Adviser	

Summary

The core objective of Innovation & Growth (IG) is to strengthen the UK’s competitiveness as the world’s leading global hub for financial and professional services (FPS). This includes promoting the strengths of the UK’s offer and enhancing the UK’s position as a leader in FPS technology and innovation.

The following report summarises the activity that has been taking place across IG in relation to cyber and economic crime, as well as cross-team working between IG and the City of London Police (CoLP) since the ECCC last convened in February 2024. The report focuses on next steps for the AI Innovation Challenge.

Links to the Corporate Plan

The activities set out in this report help deliver against the Corporate Plan’s outcome to support dynamic economic growth. Specifically, ensuring that the City has the safest, most secure business environment in the world and promoting the UK as a place that is open, innovative, and sustainable.


Main Report

Innovation & Growth activity

AI Innovation Challenge

1. At the last session, IG updated members on plans for an AI Innovation Challenge to be delivered in 2024. The Challenge will support the development of novel AI solutions to tackle a fraud and/or cyber security threats facing FPS. This “use case” will be identified through engagement with key players across the tech and FPS ecosystem.
2. IG has engaged with the Police Authority as well as Challenge Partners Microsoft and the Department of Business and Trade, to discuss the timeline for the Challenge. While the public facing element will run across 6-8 weeks, the

Challenge is a large piece of work running throughout 2024. The following graphic outlines the timeline:



3. A priority for IG is identifying the cyber/fraud threat that the Challenge will work to address. On 20th March, work to identify the use case began with two roundtables welcoming representatives from FPS and tech. Representatives Microsoft and the Police Authority also attended and David Harvey, Director for Cyber Response, KPMG chaired. The roundtables aimed to identify the main cyber security and fraud based threats facing FPS that could be addressed using technology. In addition, the team wanted to understand the tech solutions already available to address these threats and barriers to adoption. These sessions would help to inform the use case that the Challenge would work to address.
4. The FPS roundtable welcomed a diverse group of incumbents, challenger banks, fintechs, legal firms and payments providers. Key findings included:
 - a. The use of Machine learning and AI by FPS over 10+ years had shown promise in payments, fraud monitoring and authentication.
 - b. Concerns were voiced about how AI could be used to amplify existing threats such as phishing and social engineering. There was a lack of understanding about the potential impact of AI on enabling fraud through fake voice ID and deepfakes.
 - c. It was agreed that AI lowered the bar to entry to cybercrime and would likely enable high quality attack vectors with minimal effort.
 - d. The impact of AI was viewed as an arms race against threat actors. It was recognised that this would require continual investment in tackling fraud and wider cyber security.

5. The tech sector roundtable welcomed a similarly diverse group of businesses including large household names and startups specialising in AI, cyber security and fraud solutions. Key findings included:
 - a. It was highlighted that there were 3 main attack vectors related to AI:
 - i. AI Enabled Attacks - such as automated spear-phishing, vulnerability discovery or scanning.
 - ii. AI Targeted Attacks - where the attack is against the AI capability, such as data poisoning.
 - iii. AI Offensive Attacks - where the AI has agency itself (we have yet to see this but it is a possibility).
 - b. Most companies were highlighted as being under-prepared for AI adoption and only 10% were estimated to be resilient to cybercrime. There was a real concern that SMEs were under-reporting and needed to be included in efforts to counter AI attacks.
 - c. The continued success of phishing attacks demonstrated that basic cyber hygiene remains an issue.
6. Following the roundtables, a write up was provided by KPMG and Microsoft have since shared additional reflections to help shape the use case. In terms of next steps IG will now undertake targeted 1:1 stakeholder engagement to test ideas and ensure no key themes are missed. This will include representatives from the Police Authority and CoLP. The team will then come together to finalise the use case towards the end of May.
7. In addition to this, a meeting was held with CoLC marketing and media teams to set out key moments for content over the next 9 months. Possible deliverables include talking heads clips with previous participants, infographics and a new web page on Global City.

Corporate & Strategic Implications

8. Strategic implications – This work supports the Corporate Plan outcome to drive dynamic economic growth.
9. Financial implications – All budgets are contained within existing departmental budgets and business planning.
10. Resource implications – All resourcing requirements are scoped as part of departmental business planning.
11. Legal implications – None identified for this paper.
12. Risk implications – None identified for this paper.
13. Equalities implications – The stakeholder work as part of this work is mindful of balancing the needs to have the right stakeholders identified while also supporting the City of London Corporation’s EDI commitments.
14. Climate implications – None identified for this paper.
15. Security implications – None identified for this paper.

Conclusion

16.IG are committed to building on previous iterations of the Innovation Challenge. The team are exploring ways to increase the impact of the project and ensure it is valuable to the FPS and tech ecosystem. IG are also passionate about raising the profile of the AI Innovation Challenge as part of CoLC's commitment to ensuring the UK is a safe and secure place to do business.

Elly Savill

Senior Policy and Innovation Adviser
Innovation & Growth

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Agenda Item 7

Committee(s): Economic and Cyber Crime Committee	Dated: 25 June 2024
Subject: Q4 National Lead Force Performance 2023-24	Public
Which outcomes in the City Corporation's Corporate Plan does this proposal aim to impact directly?	CoLP impact the following Corp Plan outcomes: Dynamic Economic Growth- (National Lead Force) Vibrant Thriving Destination- (Community Safety/ CT)
Does this proposal require extra revenue and/or capital spending?	N/A
If so, how much?	N/A
What is the source of Funding?	N/A
Has this Funding Source been agreed with the Chamberlain's Department?	N/A
Report of: Commissioner of Police Pol 61-24	For Information
Report author: Performance Information Unit (Data and Analysis)	

Summary

This report provides Members with an update on Q4 National Lead Force Performance on the agreed measures for 2023-24.

Recommendation(s)

Members are asked to note the report.

Appendices:

Powerpoint slide pack

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National Lead Force Performance Report

Q4: January – March 2024
Page 21



Performance Assessment

The dashboard provides an assessment of City of London Police (CoLP) performance against the National Lead Force (NLF) aims and objectives as set out in the National Lead Force Plan 2020-2023 (NLF Plan). The NLF Plan was approved by the City of London Police Authority in October 2020. The Plan sets out how CoLP will improve the national response to fraud. It reflects NLF's contribution and commitment to the National Fraud Policing Strategy and the National Economic Crime Centre's (NECC) five-year strategy. The NECC leads the 'whole system' effort to drive down growth in fraud on behalf of the UK Government.

The NLF plan sets out five outcomes that City of London Police is seeking to achieve: -






			Data Trends	
			Q3	Q4
Outcome 1	Supporting and safeguarding victims	We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.	→	↑
Outcome 2	Disrupt fraudsters	We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.	↓	↑
Outcome 3	Investigate and prosecute	We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better outcomes for victims.	→	↑
Outcome 4	Raise awareness and prevent crime	We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.	→	→
Outcome 5	Building capabilities	As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capabilities to tackle fraud across policing and the wider system.	→	↑



The grading criteria can be found in Appendix A – Performance Assessment Criteria



Executive Summary

Outcome 1 	Outcome 2 	Outcome 3 	Outcome 4 	Outcome 5 
Supporting and safeguarding victims	Disrupt fraudsters	Investigate and prosecute	Raise awareness and prevent crime	Building capabilities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Action Fraud phone satisfaction was consistent. B. Online satisfaction fell by 3%. C. Higher levels of NECVCU repeat victims in Q4. D. Victim survey results show 77% confidence, and an increase in the number of respondents. E. Consistent care demonstrated. F. 90% Vulnerable Person Alerts sent in 7 days; volume increased. G. 52% of highly-likely reports reviewed in 28 days, with disseminations increasing. H. 100% victim updates sent. I. 98% cyber reports disseminated by the target 7 days. J. 93% of live cyber incidents responded to in 2 hours. K. 95% Protect advice sent in 72 hrs L. Number of Recall alerts sent consistent with Q3. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. The number of disruptions against OCGs was above Q3 and 22/23 average. B. Total disruptions against OCGs and SOC strategic vulnerabilities surpassed the 22/23 quarterly av. B. Proportionally, Q4 saw a rise in the number of Major and Moderate disruptions to OCGs. C. The number of POCA activities and value of compensation increased from Q3 but the value of activities halved. D. Disruptions against cyber enablers rose by 430% from Q3 and 46% from Q2, the previous peak. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. The number of judicial outcomes that were recorded nationally rose in Q4 and matched the 22/23 total. B. CoLP outcomes increased but were still below the 22/23 average. C. All 45 forces remained compliant in reporting their outcomes. D. LFOR reported good performance across the range of their activities, particularly supporting national campaigns. In this period Op Henhouse 3 demonstrated excellent results. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. The number of social media posts was consistent with a range of messaging across all teams. The number of posts for the year is 37% higher than 22/23. B. The related impressions fell compared to Q3 but were consistent over 23/24. C. Op Henhouse 3 built on the previous years' success to deliver 442 arrests, 211 voluntary interviews, 283 cease & desists and 365 seizures and disruptions, along with Prevent work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. ECCA training levels increased both across number of courses (+122%) and the number of delegates trained (+143%). B. ECCA's satisfaction remained consistent. C. NLF demonstrated a range of collaborations in Q4. A project led by the Fraud Ops Team to develop a Fraud App is highlighted. D. PECT teams staffing moved closer to the end of year target, and teams demonstrated positive results in the period.



The grading criteria can be found in Appendix A – Performance Assessment Criteria






Outcome 1: Supporting and Safeguarding Victims.

NLF Role: We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

Success Measures:

- A. To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the Action Fraud telephone reporting service.
- B. To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the Action Fraud online reporting service.



Telephone Reporting Service - The Action Fraud confirmation survey looks at victim satisfaction with the service provided, call handler knowledge, and average call waiting times. Satisfaction remains stable and within target at 96.6%, whilst 96.7% of respondents found the advisor to be knowledgeable. Overall satisfaction levels remain high over the long term.

In Q4 the average call waiting time reduced by 7% from Q3 to 5.87 minutes and showed a 68% reduction on Q4 of 22/23. The average call handling time also reduced by 4% from Q3 to 21.68 minutes. However, call abandonment increased by 14% in Q4 to 21.68 minutes in line with seasonal volume increases. This represents a 35% reduction on Q4 of 22/23.

The 2023 recruitment drive and subsequent staffing uplift improved Contact Centre performance and continues to positively impact victim satisfaction. Whilst staffing levels have reduced, AF ensure that Contact Centre FTE remains above the agreed limit, and staff continue to attend bi-weekly training.

Service improvements such as enhancement of the Advisor XP Contact Centre tool (improving recording accuracy, and quality of advice/referrals to victims), continue to positively impact victim satisfaction.

To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the telephone reporting service, Action Fraud provides facilities to enhance accessibility into the service, such as the Language Line and Sign Video app to enable easier reporting for the hearing impaired.

Victim feedback satisfaction survey - Over 2.1m links delivered since October 2018, with over 22.5k respondents (1.1%) opting to provide satisfaction feedback or free text responses, which are reviewed to continuously improve the service.

Overall, 1.4% of those reporting a crime in Q4 opted to provide satisfaction feedback. Feedback indicates that Action Fraud advisors provide a consistently good service.

Online Reporting Service - Satisfaction consistently fell just below target across quarter, with an average of 83%. This drop is in line with seasonality and remains an improvement on Q4 of 2022/23's 81%.


Action Fraud are unable to amend the current web reporting tool. A new tool is in development and set to launch in 2024. It is anticipated that this will align online and telephone satisfaction. In the short term, facilities such as webchat and chatbot have improved satisfaction through provision of guidance, assisting victims through the self-reporting process, increasing advisor capacity to answer more calls and dedicate more time to supporting vulnerable callers.

Outcome 1: Supporting and Safeguarding Victims.

NLF Role: We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

Success Measures:

- C. To reduce the level of repeat victimisation after NECVCU contact.
- D. To ensure victims feel safer and more confident after NECVCU contact, with reduced emotional harm and improved sense of safety.
- E. To improve consistency of victim support across all police forces.






The **National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (NECVCU)** supports forces at a local level, delivering care to victims of fraud and cyber-crime, allowing for a consistent and national standard of care and support.

The **Level 1** service gives Protect/Prevent advice to non-vulnerable victims of fraud. The **Level 2** service engages with victims when vulnerability is identified, and by giving crime prevention advice and signposting to local support services helps the victim to cope and recover from the fraud. The **Level 3** service is escalation to the local police service due to immediate risk of harm.

Repeat Victims – The definition of a repeat victim is “a second or subsequent report by a victim of fraud who has had previous contact with NECVCU within a rolling 12-month period”. During the period there were 39 repeat victims identified, up from 18 in Q3. In Q4 both services engaged with a total of 15,499 victims, meaning the 39 repeat victims represent 0.43% of victim contacts. On average in 2024, 0.11% of victims engaged with became repeat victims.

Victims feel safer – A victim survey has been launched, measuring whether victims feel safer and more confident after contact with an Advocate. Results from Q4 show 77% are more confident and 58% feel safer following contact with the level 2 service. Response levels to the survey have been low but are expected to rise as the process is embedded.

Consistent Support – The NECVCU now supports **43** forces in England and Wales at level 1 and following a significant staff uplift in May, provides **37** forces with an additional service at level 2 (formerly 6 forces), with talks to onboard more in the future. Escalations to provide additional services to support vulnerable victims following interaction with NECVCU have risen from 416 in Q3 to 487 in Q4, demonstrating a consistent level of care to vulnerable victims.



Outcome 1: Supporting and Safeguarding Victims.

NLF Role: We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.


Success Measures:

- F. To review and, where appropriate, disseminate vulnerable person alert within 7 days.
- G. To review and respond to all allegations of fraud that meet 'highly likely' or 'likely vulnerable' on the solvability matrix, within 28 days.
- H. To provide an NFIB outcome to all victims, within 28 days.




Vulnerable Person Alerts – To identify potentially vulnerable victims, searches are run on all reports of fraud, looking for under 18s and agreed 'risky words' which highlight a vulnerability risk for the victim – such as suicide, mental health, or threats to life.

In Q4 the search found 3,288 reports came from vulnerable individuals and 100% were reviewed and disseminated for safeguarding within the target of 72 hours, demonstrating the priority placed on victim care. Activity for the year peaked in January.



Priority Allegations – The process for prioritising which reports to review was developed in 2022. Rather than monetary thresholds, fraud reports are now assessed against a number of criteria to establish a 'solvability' score. Those 'highly likely' and 'likely' to be solved are prioritised for review.

During Q4, 52% of 'highly likely' and 40% (+208%) of 'likely vulnerable' reports were reviewed within 28 days of reporting. The overall volume of disseminations for Q4 peaked in January at 10,058, as staffing increased.



Victim Contact regarding Outcomes

100% of fulfilment letters were dispatched to victims within 48 hours of the request being received.

The NFIB has multiple advice letters, tailored to each fraud type, which are emailed to victims on a weekly basis. This service is known as 'Send in Blue'. In August 2021, this process was automated, and the success rate went from a low of 59% in June to an average of 99.69% for the rest of 2021/22. In Q4 23/24, the success rate of Send in Blue was 100%.

This financial year NFIB has introduced an information letter to victims where a disruption has taken place. This additional contact has reduced complaints regarding lack of police action.



Outcome 1: Supporting and Safeguarding Victims.

NLF Role: We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

Success Measures:

- I. To review and disseminate all Action Fraud reports classified with an NFIB Cybercrime code, within 7 days of report creation.
- J. To respond to all live cybercrime reports, within 2 hours of reporting.
- K. All businesses reporting cyber enabled crime to receive Protect advice within 72 hours of receipt by the Protect Team.



Cyber Reports – In Q4, 12,014 reports were classified with a Cybercrime code, up 8% (+917) from the previous quarter and up 88% (+5,608) from Q4 22/34.

Of these reports, 100% were disseminated for Protect or Pursue activity, 98% within the target 7-day period. Performance peaked at 99% in both January and February.




Live Cyber Incidents – 25 live cyber incidents were recorded in Q4. Each one was reviewed, and a response was sent within 2 hours in 93% of the incidents, up 8% (+7) from Q3.

Delays are due to a minority of disseminations having issues such as technical problems or review by the NCA. The majority of reports are reviewed and disseminated in less than 60 minutes.

Protect Advice – NFIB Business Protect provided protect advice to 211 organisations during Q4, down 39% (-133) from the previous quarter. This is due to a change in the review process identifying less mandate frauds and therefore generating fewer referrals. The process is subject to ongoing development.

95% (201) of organisations received the advice within 72 hours of receipt by the Protect Team, down from 96% in Q3.

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Outcome 1: Supporting and Safeguarding Victims.

NLF Role: We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.


Success Measures:

L. To help victims of fraud to prevent or recover losses through information sharing with the banking sector and support from victim care.



The **NLF Victim Care Unit** is a unique team, which acts as a conduit between NLF Fraud Ops Investigations and their victims of fraud. NLF VCU ensure that the Victims Code Of Practice is complied with and address the welfare needs of victims by triaging out to support services. They also play a part in the Protect strand of the 4P plan by proactively offering prevention advice to stop re-victimization, also disrupting OCG activity.



NLF VCU have an ongoing partnership with TrueCall who install call blocking devices for victims who receive high volumes of fraudulent calls. Volumes were steady throughout 23/24 but remained below the 22/23 average due to devices no longer being used. The team has issued further units during the year, 3 in Q4.



Project RECALL is an initiative for informing banks about fraudulent payments so they may consider acting against beneficiary accounts and repatriate victims' money. This quarter 2,264 account alerts were sent to banks, down 5% from Q3 (-111). The value of Q4 alerts also fell from £ 9,538,812 to £5,755,030 (-40%). Volumes of alerts have fallen since their peak in August 2023, but remain above the 22/23 benchmark. Recall has noted a fall in manually processed alerts from foreign law enforcement, which typically contain high loss payment diversion frauds. This is a likely reason for lower recorded losses in Q3 and 4.

In Q2 NFIB analysed data, held meetings with participating banks and reviewed processes with UK Finance. This work helped to identify best practices within banks and create recommendations to improve the process. New relationships with additional financial institutions were established so that more alerts can be sent and acted upon.

The number of disrupted bank accounts has risen since the inception of the project. The initiative allows for funds to be returned to victims and disrupts fraudsters, demonstrates good partnership working, and provides CoLP with the ability to start an investigation if an alert is missed by a bank.






Outcome 2: Disrupt Fraudsters.

NLF Role: We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.

Success Measures:

- A. To sustain the level of National Lead Force disruptions against Organised Crime Groups and Strategic Vulnerabilities.
- B. To increase the proportion of Major and Moderate disruptions.



There are currently 68 mapped **Organised Crime Groups (OCGs)** under investigation by National Lead Force teams, down one from Q3. There were **32 disruptions** claimed against NLF OCGs in Q4, a 52% increase on both Q3 (+11) and the quarterly average from 2022/23.

A **major** disruption represents the OCG being fully dismantled or impacted at a key player level. There have been 2 major disruptions in Q4, and 17 moderates. There were an additional 236 disruptions against Serious Organised Crime strategic vulnerabilities throughout the period, in line with the Q3 reporting.

In 22/23 major disruptions represented 15% of all OCG disruption activity. In 23/24 this has increased to 16% throughout the year. Likewise, moderate disruptions have increased from 48% to 53% year on year.

Activity against OCGs is not consistent and depends on a number of factors, including resources, capacity, and criminal activity. It is worth noting that 34 of the active operations are Tier 4 investigations, meaning they are **awaiting court results** and/or are in their final stages before being archived. This means no further operational activity is planned against them and the only disruption left to claim is a major once sentences are delivered. There have been many adjourned NLF cases in the last year, mostly due to Covid backlogs and barrister strikes.

Notable Major Disruptions

A **Fraud Operations** team secured a conviction of 5 years for a mastermind who ran an investment fraud scheme, after he pled guilty to money laundering and conspiracy to defraud. Two others in the OCG pleaded guilty and received suspended sentences. To date, the investigation has identified over 310 victims who deposited over £12m. The investigation showed that none of the victims' money had been invested. In 2018 reports to Action Fraud claimed victims were unable to retrieve their investment. Analysis showed the money was moved, including to crypto currency and foreign jurisdictions. The proceeds were used to purchase high-end cars, gold bullion and luxury jewellery, which were seized and will be auctioned, with the proceeds used to pay back the victims.




A gang that used aliases from films and TV shows such as Suits, The Riot Club and Hart to Hart have been jailed for a combined five years and eight months following a second **Fraud Operations** investigation. The defendants acted as 'brokers' and would cold-call members of the public to persuade them to invest in a managed account scheme. It was widely accepted during the trial that the investment proposition was a Ponzi scheme, and investors' funds were simply at the disposal of the defendants.

Outcome 2: Disrupt Fraudsters.

NLF Role: We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.

Success Measures:

C. To increase the use of POCA powers to freeze, restrain and protect proceeds of crime.



Notable POCA Activities

A suspect was identified by **IFED** intelligence and a referral regarding a suspected ghost broker. A total of 27 policies were incepted in 2023 where the ghost brokering activity was suspected. Having identified a number of bank accounts that were involved, IFED obtained 7 account freezing orders. In total an amount of £96,767 is suspected to be from this unlawful criminal conduct. This is an ongoing active investigation which is not yet complete.

A man who committed £280,000 of fraud was sentenced to two years and six months in prison after pleading guilty to committing fraud by false representation, for being in possession of articles for use in fraud and for money laundering offences, following a successful investigation by **DCPCU**. The fraud was spotted by the victim's bank and referred to DCPCU to investigate. Officers executed a search warrant at his home, where evidence linked to the fraud was recovered, including designer goods and £100,000 in cash. Additionally, officers identified that he was using the victim's funds to pay for a storage unit which was searched and contained designer goods with an auction estimated value between £137,850 and £180,600. The victim was refunded by their bank.

Use of POCA Powers

In Q4, Operational Fraud teams and Funded Units carried out 20 POCA activities showing recovery from Q2 (+25%) and Q3 (+43%). This is above the 2022/23 quarterly average of 15 and brings the 23/24 quarterly average to 19 activities.

Most of the activity focused on cash detention orders (9) followed by confiscations (7). The greatest value came in January, driven by a confiscation order by DCPCU totalling £204,064. Additionally, the teams worked to ensure that Courts awarded 3 victims £210,792 compensation bringing the total compensation in 23/24 to over double that of 22/23.






Outcome 2: Disrupt Fraudsters.

NLF Role: We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.

Success Measures:

D. To increase the identification and disruption of cyber enablers to curtail criminality and protect victims.



PIPCU's Op Ashiko focussed on the supply of counterfeit goods by China-based shipping agents through disruption to social media platforms. Ashiko continues to work in collaboration with internet service providers to suspend infringing domains and other criminality. In Q4 entities posing as representatives of Formula 1 were suspended and a mandate fraud was disrupted to prevent a £1.3m loss.

DCPCU executed a warrant at an address in East London and two suspects were arrested for fraud offences. Evidence of remote access tools was uncovered on devices, alongside SIM farms and compromised customer data. This has now been successfully safeguarded accounting for the spike in bank account disruptions in March. Both suspects were charged and remanded in custody, highlighting the unit's commitment to tackling high harm offending. Minister Tom Tugendhat was present at the execution of the warrant alongside representatives from the Home Office and national media.


NFIB's Prevention and Disruption team (P&D) identified a domain as impersonating a college. Further investigation found that the registrant was registering new domains daily under a variety of names, all of which appeared to be involved in mandate fraud. This resulted in excess of 2,200 domains being suspended in March, before they had the opportunity to inflict harm on members of the public. Due to this work, March 2024 has recorded the highest number of disruptions for P&D.

Disruptions to Technological Enablers

During Q4, a total of 16,280 disruptions to technological enablers were recorded, higher than the previous quarters in 23/24. Volumes of disruptions across all platforms rose, particularly to websites due to proactive work by P&D, and bank accounts due to a planned operation by DCPCU.

Volumes of disruptions fluctuate throughout the year according to operational priorities, opportunities and intensifications.

During the quarter, P&D prevented approximately £12,578,110 of potential loss to victims through their disruption activities.





Outcome 3: Investigate and Prosecute.

NLF Role: We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better criminal justice outcomes for victims.

Success Measures:

- A. To increase the number of judicial outcomes recorded nationally by Policing.
- B. To increase the number of judicial outcomes recorded by City of London Police.
- C. To maintain the level of Home Office forces in the compliant category for reporting at 100%.



In Q4 2023/24 the **National** yield of judicial outcomes increased to 1,474, up 34% (+375) on the previous year's Q4 1,099. This is primarily due to the final quarter push by the NCO in ensuring that forces were up to date with their returns. A draft full year position indicates that nationally we received 5,811 judicial outcomes for 23/24, which is 36 below last year (-0.6%) on 5,847.

The NCO is also working with Forces to ensure that they are aware of all their aged disseminations, particularly across the periods of 2019-20 to 2021-22. Force engagement visits continue with a particular focus on the National Policing Strategy for Fraud, Economic and Cyber Crime 2023 – 2028.

CoLP Judicial outcomes are up from Q3 to Q4 by 18 (+54%), and up by 9 (+21%) from Q4 22/23. In Q1 last year the Fraud teams undertook a sweeping exercise of old Judicial outcomes, finalising 186 in total through this process. When comparing year on year performance and excluding this 186, CoLP achieved 152 judicial outcomes in the period last year, 12 more than 23/24's total of 140.

The total outcomes reported in a period can relate to disseminations from any time frame. The volume of outcomes is expected to fluctuate throughout the year as cases with varying numbers of crimes attached are seen in courts. For example, one investigation into a boiler room might have hundreds of outcomes attached to it and closing the case will give many outcomes, potentially bringing closure to multiple victims.

Judicial outcomes refer to Home Office Counting Rules Outcomes 1-8 which include charges, cautions, taken into consideration etc. (they do not refer to the wider criminal justice process).

Forces Providing Outcome Information	
FY 22/23	
	No. Forces
Compliant (10-12 Returns)	45
Partially Compliant (7-9 Returns)	0
Non Compliant (0-6 Returns)	0
FY 23/24 FYTD	
	No. Forces
Compliant (10-12 Returns)	45
Partially Compliant (7-9 Returns)	0
Non Compliant (0-6 Returns)	0

Forces are required to provide outcome information to CoLP every month, matched against their NFIB disseminations. In 2023/24, all forces were compliant each month. The National Coordinators Office (NCO) continue to engage with forces to ensure compliance is maintained.



Outcome 3: Investigate and Prosecute.

NLF Role: We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better criminal justice outcomes for victims.

Success Measures:

D. Through leadership of LFOR improve the coordination of Operational Activity across Policing to increase Pursue outcomes for victims.



National and International Coordination and Assistance

LFOR assisted other Forces and Regions with **7 requests for assistance** during Q4 2023/24. The requests were for arrests and premises searches. This is a key role of LFOR who provide Operational and Investigative support to all UK Forces and Regions, to progress cases with enquiries in London.

A high number of **OCG** activities that impact victims across the country have links to London, and by providing such support LFOR are supporting partners in expecting positive outcomes and disruption opportunities.

LFOR received and developed **5 cases** that were subject of **Case Acceptance Plans** for consideration by NLF Operations. This matches the 5 cases in the previous quarter.

There have also been **20 International requests for assistance** from Foreign Law Enforcement Agencies. These are managed within LFOR, and during this quarter the highest number of requests were from Spain and Poland. The average time for completion for Q4 was 60 days which is well within the 90-day target.

Operation Henhouse 3 was a **National PURSUE intensification Campaign** coordinated by LFOR and run throughout February 2024, focusing on fast-tracking any outstanding fraud investigations. The operation has seen a 52% increase in its arrest rate comparing to the previous year (Henhouse 2). An estimated £13m in cash was seized and over 440 arrests made through the month.

LFOR has launched **drop-in Fraud Surgeries** within CoLP, providing assistance to officers force-wide. These allow colleagues to discuss unresolved fraud-related investigations with National Lead Force detectives who can assist with arrests, interviews and case building, and these have been well received.

The Intelligence Development Team (IDT), alongside LFOR, have been **supporting an investigation** by the Metropolitan Police Cyber Crime Unit of a web-based platform which describes itself as a one-stop shop for phishing. This website has enabled criminals to steal vast amounts of identity information including bank details. There has been collaborative working between the MPS, ROCUs and PECTs, with IDT producing 43 intelligence packages that have assisted with a successful arrest phase. LFOR assisted in the coordination of 37 arrests worldwide to disrupt this service.



Outcome 4: Raise Awareness and Prevent Crime.

NLF Role: We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.

Success Measures:

- A. To increase the number of Social Media posts.
- B. To increase the reach of Social Media posts (impressions).




Across the various teams engaging on social media, the number of posts fell by 4% to 361 which is above the 22/23 quarterly average of 297. The number of related impressions also dropped slightly by 7% to 2,216,699, still showing positive engagement. It is believed the drop in quarterly impressions is due to Facebook performing a platform 'cleanse', removing many Bot accounts. During the quarter, the Media Team also oversaw 11 press releases and 10 interviews, an increase to the previous quarter.

- **PIPCU** posted on social media after a search warrant at a counterfeit vinyl factory, supported by the British Phonographic Industry (BPI) which featured in a Guardian article. DC Daryl Fryatt was interviewed by Bloomberg Business on a music hacking case.
- **IPED** was represented by DC Ram on CoLP's 'Who We Are' social media series, and a week-long series of posts on ghost broking, coinciding with National Student Money Week. DCI Tom Hill was interviewed by The Times for an article on crash for cash and the 'Diary of a Claims Handler' podcast.
- **NLF** and **LFOR** social media revolved around Op Henhouse 3 with posts outlining the overall policing activity. Other press releases included notable sentencings and operations.
- **Action Fraud** issued an alert statement on an increased number of reports on fake emails claiming to be from NCA agents.
- **DCPCU** posted regarding Det Supt Robinson appearing on Crimewatch and DC Boxall's participation in Coutts' 'How to Catch a Fraudster' panel event. They also filmed with BBC One's 'Moment of Truth'.


In Q4 **Action Fraud** in partnership with ABTA and ATOL, launched its 2024 holiday fraud campaign, focusing on empowering consumers with fraud prevention tips on how to protect themselves against holiday fraud. The campaign used engaging visuals, infographics, and social media messaging containing advice and guidance to spread awareness and encourage safe holiday shopping habits.

The campaign received over 20.6m impressions and reached over 5 million accounts. The posts were used over 300 times by police forces, industry stakeholders and partners. The holiday fraud campaign launch post was the best performing post of Q4. The campaign garnered media coverage from both national and regional papers, including The Sun, Evening Standard and the Independent.

Social Media Posts



Social Media Impressions



Outcome 4: Raise Awareness and Prevent Crime.

NLF Role: We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.

Success Measures:

C. To deliver campaigns and participate in intensification periods to raise awareness and drive prevention activity.



Operation Henhouse 3 – LFOR Coordination

Building on the success of Operation Henhouse 2 (HH2) in March 2023, the Lead Force Operations Room (LFOR) led the co-ordination of a National Fraud Intensification in February 2024 in partnership with the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC). Henhouse 3 (HH3) had a record representation rate of 100%, as all forces and ROCUs nationally took part in the HH3 intensification.

- HH3 resulted in **442 arrests**, compared with 289 during Henhouse 2, a 52.9% increase. There were also 211 voluntary interviews, 283 cease and desists, and 365 seizures and disruptions during the operation. This shows greater results across the board compared to Henhouse 1 and 2.
- There were a range of **disruption tactics** used by forces throughout HH3, including Cease and Desist Notices (C&D). Overall, 283 C&D Notices were produced during Henhouse 3 compared with 370 during Henhouse 2, a decrease of 23.5%. Although fewer C&D notices were issued, HH3 saw a greater result, due to the increased focus on pursue activity.
- Some forces focused on **prevent work**, for example awareness about Romance Fraud scams, particularly around Valentine's day, as well as carrying out in-person fraud awareness sessions, including talking to students and the elderly.
- Operation HH3 resulted in a total of **£13.8m in seizures**, disruptions and restraints, and an additional £5.1m in account freezing orders.

Operation Henhouse 3 – CoLP Teams

As part of the intensification period, CoLP were involved in additional operations to target fraud, as well as serving cease and desists, and warrants. Highlights include:

- **PIPCU** were involved in the disruption of a factory which was producing counterfeit vinyl records. The factory contained four pressing machines which were used to create the vinyls, and the estimated loss to the industry if these were to be sold was over £1 million.
- **Fraud Operations** led an operation to target investment fraud, which enabled multiple warrants to be executed in London and Kent.
- **DCPCU** made the most arrests within CoLP, with 16 arrests made in total during the intensification period. Two of the individuals who were arrested possessed sim farms, the seizure of which stopped high numbers of fraudulent texts being sent to potential victims. The warrant was attended by the security minister Tom Tugendhat to coincide with the Home Office campaign titled Stop! Think Fraud.

Stop! Think Fraud – National Campaign

On 12th February 2024, the Stop Think Fraud national campaign launched. The national campaign against fraud supports the delivery of the UK Government's Fraud Strategy. It has been created to empower a mass audience, and help people take action that will prevent them falling victim to fraud. The campaign will drive the public to a new website, where they can find advice and guidance on how they might be at risk, how to spot fraud, how to report it to Action Fraud and how to protect themselves. The City of London Police is a strategic partner of the campaign and committed to its success. AC Nik Adams completed media interviews with LBC Radio and ITV Lunchtime news promoting the new campaign.



Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

NLF Role: As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

Success Measures:


- A. To increase delegate training levels in the Economic and Cybercrime Academy.
- B. To maintain delegate satisfaction levels at 90% or above.



Training Courses

The ECCA delivered 40 training courses in Q4, an increase of 122% from Q3 (+22), but a slight drop of 9% (-4) from Q4 22/23. Activity for the year peaked in March with 14 courses and 179 delegates. On average the Academy provided 10 courses per month in 22/23 and 8 in 23/24. Some of this decrease can be explained by last minute cancellation of courses.

Delegate numbers rose from 207 in Q3 to 503 in Q4, representing an increase of 143% (+269). Delegate numbers were higher in 22/23 at 545 for the quarter, a fall of 7% (-42). This quarter, most delegates were from UK policing, with remainder from the public sector.





Satisfaction for the quarter averaged at 94%, continuing to score consistently above the 22/23 benchmark. The percentage of delegates completing feedback was also consistent at 68%, as trainers are now providing time for this process within the classroom.

The Academy is monitoring the impact of training on attendees and their roles, which will inform future training when the results are analysed. The ECCA is also running a recruitment campaign, actively onboarding new Associate Trainers with specific skill sets to ensure resilience across the courses, and to build capacity and enable more training to be delivered.

The Academy provided Money Laundering Courses to CoLP officers and staff including Financial Investigators, from teams across the force, ensuring they have appropriate skills and providing career development. A Victim Care course was also run for NECVCU staff.

Further Money Laundering courses were delivered to ROCUs, PSNI and Police Scotland. CPS delegates attended Internet Investigators' Foundation Courses which may become a regular fixture. A range of courses were delivered to organisations including the NCA, such as Policing Electoral Fraud, Demystifying Cybercrime, Bribery, Specialist Fraud Investigator and Fraud Foundation courses. The new Associate Trainer delivered their first Money Laundering course and received fantastic feedback.



Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

NLF Role: As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

Success Measures:

C. To collaborate with industry and partners to develop innovative new ways to better protect victims and disrupt serious offending.



CoLP forms part of a multitude of **inter-agency groups** who tackle fraud and cybercrime in partnership. Teams work closely with a wide range of law enforcement and government agencies, banks and industry partners. In Q4 2023/24:

PIPCU investigated rogue host companies facilitating fraudulent websites and fake shops; working with partner agencies to coordinate disruption to the infrastructures. They carried out voluntary interviews in disruption work with FACT targeting those selling illegal access to premium TV content. PIPCU also attended a conference with the EU IPO; this work across Europe targets the sale of counterfeit shoes and clothing.

IDT hosted DateSafe, a multiagency working group to discuss and promote safer online dating spaces and the impact of romance fraud, with over 50 attendees from law enforcement and industry. IDT are supporting an NCA led project, tackling fraud from high-risk countries. They are also supporting the Romance Fraud and Payment Diversion Fraud cells, working with the banking sector on collaborative opportunities.

Fraud Ops met the FCA to generate tactical and strategic processes to maximise resources and support the flow of intelligence, case acceptance and covert opportunities to tackle offenders. They met the Corporation's Counter Fraud Manager to look at ways to share intelligence via the National Fraud Database. Officers also engaged with other forces to discuss the role of Investigative Support Officers, and new approaches to Audio Transcribing.

The **VCU** and Financial Ombudsman agreed a referral route to assist vulnerable victims of fraud where their banks have failed. VCU also partnered with UK Finance to gain access to the Bank Notification Form.

Spotlight on Fraud and Economic Crime App

In 2022, CoLP Fraud Operations and the Economic and the Cyber Crime Academy (ECCA) engaged the services of a third-party App Developer, Crimson. The purpose of this was to design a Fraud and Economic Crime App to assist front line officers and staff not ordinarily exposed to fraud and economic crime. The App will bridge the knowledge gap emanating from the initial training they receive, ensuring they can give the very best response when serving the public and preventing repeat victimisation. The content has been created by the ECCA and generated into an intuitive, easy-to-use platform by Crimson.

The Fraud and Economic Crime App offers a quick reference guide to legislation, prevent and protect advice and investigative considerations, to assist officers any time of the day. It has been designed to be relevant to any officer in England and Wales, no matter which force they work for. The national guidance offered is considered best practice and has been trialled within CoLP using a cross-sectional focus group whose feedback was extremely positive. The App was fully developed in 2023 and has been trialled in North-East Forces, with one force stating that it's the easiest App they have integrated into their IT system. The App was specifically created as a SharePoint table which can be integrated into any force's app environment.

The app reflects CoLP's ongoing investment, as National Lead Force for Fraud, to upskill police personnel and respond to fraud related offences, ultimately providing victims with a consistent and competent response, no matter where they are in the UK.



Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

NLF Role: As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

Success Measures:

D. To improve the capacity to police fraud and cybercrime by implementing additional posts and improving attraction, recruitment and retention.



Establishment of a new Fraud Policing Network (PURSUE):

- The nine Regional Proactive Economic Crime Teams (PECTs) are established, and enlargement of the London response (MPS and CoLP) is being implemented with a DI and DS already in post along with an intelligence lead, and a performance lead will be starting in May. Three DCs from the MPS will be recruited in 2024/25.
- By the end of March 2024, 160 regional posts were in place across the network, representing 95% of the 168-post target achieved by 2023/24. This is across both the Police/SOC Uplift Programme and HMG Spending Review investment funding.
- The growth in investigative capacity in CoLP NLF Fraud Operations has resulted in eight new Police Staff Investigators and a PSI Supervisor being in place. A Disclosure Officer is also to be recruited.

Notable operational examples include:

WMROCU - Courier Fraud series, warrants executed, and 2 suspects arrested, charged and remanded.

SWROCU - Romance Fraudster located and interviewed, offending spanning years. File being prepared for CPS.


NWROCU - 12 Charges for DPD driver impersonation fraud.

YHROCU - Protect officers engaged with regional universities during national Student Money Week with information stands.

TARIAN - Arrest of male who had been served a Cease & Desist in 2023 and was still offending.







NEROCU - Request from Royal Mail for investigation into sale of counterfeit stamps worth £400k-£500k. MOU currently being agreed.

SEROCU - Two warrants in Kent for fraud within a local council. Arrest of 1 nominal.



Appendix A - Performance Assessment Criteria

In order to identify if these outcomes are being achieved a series of success measures for each outcome have been produced and are reported on throughout the period. The success measures related to each outcome can be found at the start of each slide alongside the current assessment for the relevant measure. These have been identified based on the data available, and whether the data is increasing or decreasing within the required tolerance level.

Success Measure Performance Assessment	
Page 39 	A green upwards arrow suggests improvement in the direction of travel.
	A green arrow pointing right is used for consistent performance at 100%.
	A green arrow pointing down means a decreasing trend which is positive.
	Amber means there has been limited increases or decreases within tolerance level.
	A red upwards arrow suggests an increasing trend that is negative.
	A red downward arrow suggests a decrease in performance.



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Committee(s): Economic and Cyber Crime Committee	Dated: 25 June 2024
Subject: Q4 Cyber Griffin update	Public
Which outcomes in the City Corporation's Corporate Plan does this proposal aim to impact directly?	This is not a proposal but CoLP impact the following Corp Plan outcomes: Vibrant Thriving Destination- (Community Safety/ CT) Dynamic Economic Growth- (National Lead Force)
Does this proposal require extra revenue and/or capital spending?	N/A
If so, how much?	N/A
What is the source of Funding?	N/A
Has this Funding Source been agreed with the Chamberlain's Department?	N/A
Report of: Commissioner of Police Pol 63-24	For Information
Report author: Inspector Charlie Morrison, Cyber Griffin	

SUMMARY

At the close of the financial year 23/24 Cyber Griffin has achieved its targets and delivered to 50,000 since its inception in 2017. The quarter also saw the successful launch of Cyber Griffin's sixth core service, the Incident Response Hydra which has received universally positive feedback. Positively, the Cyber Capability Assessment, will soon be returning to Cyber Griffin's offering following training due to take place in Q1/2024. New challenging targets have been established for the financial year 24/25 to further test the programme's ability to extend its impact within the community.

Two further reports have been attached for the attention of members regarding the local establishment's current funding and a detailed design for national rollout.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that Members note the report.

MAIN REPORT


INTRODUCTION

1. This report gives a brief update on the current position of the Cyber Griffin programme. For details of all Cyber Griffin services please visit: www.cybergriffin.police.uk


CURRENT PERFORMANCE POSITION

- Cyber Griffin trained 4,205 end users in Q4. This was 12% above the quarter's target of 3,750 and in keeping with what is historically a strong period of performance within the financial year.


Graph showing Cyber Griffin's cumulative end users trained over four financial years.



Graphs showing Cyber Griffin's quarterly users trained compared over four financial years.



Graph showing the number of Cyber Griffin services delivered over four financial years.



3. Regarding locally set targets, in Q4, the programme trained 4,205 people (quarterly target of 3,750), conducted 92 services (quarterly target of 80) and partnered with 26 new client organisations (quarterly target of 44).
4. Regarding performance against national targets, Cyber Griffin continues to meet all nationally set key performance indicators (KPIs). Specifically, the programme has engaged with 100% of victims of cyber-dependent crime. Survey data also demonstrates that engagements create security behaviour changes in above 75 % of delegates. The same events have a satisfaction rate of considerably above 75%.
5. In summary, Cyber Griffin has had another very successful year and exceeded its targets. The programme achieved 103% of end users trained (15,512). This is a 40% increase on last year's final number (11,102). The programme achieved 120% of services conducted (384). This is a 22% increase on last year's final number (315). The programme achieved 105% of new client's partnered with (184) which was the same final number as the previous financial year.
6. On review of the year's performance, Cyber Griffin now receives a significant amount of work from return clients. It is forecasted that this trend will increase and will therefore, need to be balanced with the programme's commitment to engage with new businesses in our community. It is also acknowledged that Cyber Griffin has again exceeded its targets. Considering the success against the heightened targets this year, new more challenging targets have been set to stretch the programme; these are 18,000 end users trained, 400 services conducted, and 200 clients engaged with. It should be noted that these targets sit above anticipated forecasts. Work is being conducted over the coming

quarter to build a time-series model that will be able to forecast future performance with greater accuracy.

7. Cyber Griffin's financial situation is strong but requires review. The programme has confirmed both the Corporation Business Levy and NPCC Cyber Crime Programme funding until March 2025. Additional costs have been incurred due to the recent officer and staff pay rises, but existing budgets are sufficient to absorb this cost for the next financial year. A decision has been made that Cyber Griffin will be costed against the direct costing model. This means that Cyber Griffin is expected to remain in budget for the next financial year, though the funding envelope will need review for financial year 24/25.
8. In light of changes in the threat landscape, Cyber Griffin is now developing a new iteration of the Baseline Briefing, which will include a section focused on artificial intelligence (AI). Enough is known about this developing threat area to provide advice and guidance on defences to mitigate the new risks posed by AI. The release of the Baseline Briefing 5.0 is scheduled for the Q2 of this financial year.
9. Cyber Griffin successfully launched its latest services in January this year, the Incident Response Hydra. This work was the culmination of three years of academically supported research and alpha and beta testing with private organisations. The simulation has now be conducted with several organisations all of which returned outstanding feedback regarding both the quality of the exercise and actionable outcomes provided to them.
10. Training on the Cyber Capability Assessment which utilises the CDCAT® software has now been scheduled for all officers in Cyber Griffin. This is due to take place in Q1 of the next financial year and will enable the full relaunch of this service. Cyber Griffin already has assessments scheduled following this training. This will close a longstanding issue with this aspect of Cyber Griffin's offering.
11. Two further papers have been added to this report for the ECCC's attention. One details Cyber Griffin's current financial position alongside the impact of forecasted inflation costs in future years. The other, is a summary of the investigation into the possible national rollout of specific Cyber Griffin services.

CONCLUSION

12. With the results from this quarter, the Cyber Griffin programme has reached the landmark of having trained 50,000. Everyone involved in this work is extremely proud of this achievement. Following the pervious financial year's performance, more challenging targets have been set for financial year 24/25. In addition to regular update two further reports have been submitted for the attention of members detailing Cyber Griffin's current financial position and a detailed design for the programme's national rollout.

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of the Local Government Act 1972.

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